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The Battle of Ciudad Juarez: Death Knell of
the Porfirian Regime in Mexico
LAWRENCE D. TAYLOR

The battle that ended with the Anti-Reelectionists' capture of the border town of Ciudad Juarez in Chihuahua in May 19 U is probably the
best~known of the military actions that occurred during the early phase
of the Mexican Revolution. In the wake of the treaty that was signed at
Ciudad Juarez, hostilities ended and Porfirio Diaz resigned. It was widely
held that this action constituted the key event that toppled the old regime and ushered in a new period of rule. This assumption came to form
popular ideas about the battle and its significance in the forging of the
modern Mexican nation.
Over the years, researchers have hotly contended the importance of
the battle as an historical event. Some historians, in reviewing the insurrection of 191 0-1911 have claimed that the battle was only the culminating blow in the war that resulted in Diaz's resignation and exile. I A few
researchers have drawn attention to other military actions that occurred
at the end of the struggle, which they consider also formed a part of the
sequence of events that ended with Diaz's overthrow. One such engagement was the storming ofCuautla, Morelos, on 19 May 1911 by an armed
group under the command of Emiliano Zapata. In terms of the numbers
of combatants, this battle rivaled that of Juarez. 2
One of the most recent interpretations of the significance of the
battle of Ciudad Juarez is that of British historian Alan Knight. Knight
argues that the Porfirian army had not been beaten by the time of the
signing of the peace treaty and that it had really been betrayed by
Lawrence D. Taylor is a researcher with the Departamento de Estudios Culturales,
EI Colegio de la Frontera Norte, in Tijuana, Mexico. He is the author of La gran
aventura en Mexico: el popel de los volun/arios extranjeros en los eje~citos
revolucionarios mexicanos. 1910-1915 and La revuelto magonista de 1911 en
Baja California.
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politicos in the capital, who, rather than witness the country slip into
further bloodshed and chaos, were prepared to make peace at any price.
According to Knight, the treaty that was negotiated at Ciudad Juarez
between the two contending factions was motivated more by political
than military considerations:

... the transaccion which ended the Diaz regime represented
not the logical culmination of a narrow, controlled, political revolution, but rather the alarmed reaction-on the part of elites on
both sides-to a mounting social upheaval ... The army emerged
from the 191 1 revolution larger than in the last days of the Diaz
regime ... In no sense had it been whipped: no major battles had
been lost; of the cities of the Republic only Juarez had been
taken by the rebels a Juerza y sangre. 3
I intend to take another look at the battle over Juarez and analyze it
within the overall context of the war in northern Mexico and particularly
against the backdrop of U.S.-Mexican relations during this period. While
not denying that other engagements during the 1910-1911 revolt-such
as the Zapatista victory at Cuautla-constituted important advances in
the rebel campaign against the Diaz government, I argue that the results
of the rebel victory at Ciudad Juarez were especially significant for two
reasons. Not only did the fall of the city consitutute the key to the
collapse of the federal army's hold over northern Mexico, but, more importantly, it also marked a triumph for the insurrectos (rebels) in the
international arena as well. The capture of the city resulted in a significant shift in the U.S. government's attitude and policy toward the rebellion, allowing the insurrectos to freely bring arms into Mexico. This, in
conjunction with the effect of the city's fall and the collapse of the
federal forces in general, sounded the death knell of the Porfirian regime.
In order to properly understand the context in which the battle occurred, it is useful to trace Francisco Madero's strategy and direction of
the Anti-Reelectionist insurrection in the northern border region from
its beginnings to the siege of Juarez in mid-April 1911. It is also important to focus on the U.S. government's reaction to the rebellion as it
developed in Mexico.
The capture of a northern Mexican border city had constituted a key
objective of Madero and his immediate circle of followers since the initial call to arms with the publication of the Plan of San Luis Potosi and
the beginning of the armed revolt on 10 November 1910. While engaged
in planning the rebellion in the headquarters of the revolutionary junta
(council) in San Antonio, Texas, they had come to believe that it was
possible to create a general insurrectionary movement in Mexico in the
form of a number of separate, but coordinated uprisings in the larger
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cities, supported and sustained by popular disturbances in the smaller
urban and rural areas. They assumed that the participants in these revolts would join Madero's army, which the provisional president planned
to form and direct from a base in northern Coahuila. 4
With this project in mind, Madero gave money to his uncle Catarino
Benavides, a resident of Coahuila, to recruit volunteers and purchase
small arms and munitions. Madero and a few armed companions-his
brothers Julio and Raul, Jose Diaz (also a relative), and three ex-federal
army officers named Rafael Aguilar and Ruben and Octavio Moralesplanned to meet with Benavides and the Coahuilan recruits on 20 November on one of the islands of the Rio Bravo near the border towns of
Eagle Pass, Texas, and Ciudad Porfirio Diaz (present-day Piedras Negras).
On the appointed day, Benavides met with Madero and his small group,
but he had been unable to recruit more than ten poorly armed volunteers.
Disappointed, Madero journeyed with his brother Raul to New Orleans, where the two bided their time in the hope that a significant rebel
uprising might occur either in Veracruz or in some other region bordering the Gulf of Mexico. In the event that this happened, they would
board a vessel headed for the region with the intent of leading the revolt
there. When the anticipated large-scale rebellion failed to materialize,
the two Madero brothers decided to move on. s Undeterred, they returned
to San Antonio and from there proceeded to Dallas. After a week's stay,
they went on to El Paso, where they helped to establish a revolutionary
junta in that city in coordination with Abraham Gonzalez, the most prominent of the Chihuahuan insurrecto leaders. 6
The El Paso junta also devised a plan for Chihuahua. Madero, together with some recruits, would enter Chihuahua a few miles downstream from El Paso at Ysleta to join the rebel group headed by Pascual
Orozco, who until that time had been the most successful of the insurrection leaders in the state. They would then proceed to Casas Grandes
in northwestern Chihuahua, and try to take it by surprise. At the same
time, they would recruit and arm as many followers as possible by means
of captured arms in order to sieze other towns in the region, such as
Janos, Guzman, and Palomas. They would sever rail and telegraph communications in order to isolate Chihuahua from other federal garrisons
in the state. Once these objectives had been fulfilled, the insurrectos
would lay siege to Ciudad Juarez, the most important link on the border
between Mexico and the United States. The capture of the city and its
customhouse would, they believed, allow the rebels to import foodstuffs,
merchandise, and war materials into Mexico. It might also induce the
United States government to recognize the Maderistas as belligerents. 7
At the time of the rebellion's inception, President William H. Taft
favored keeping the Diaz regime in power. In reply to the Mexican
government's denouncement of rebels trafficking men and arms across
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the international .border, Taft gave his assurances that he would do his
best to uphold American neutrality within the limits of U.S. law. 8
American neutrality legislation was contained in the Revised Statutes of 1873. Sections 5281 and 5282 prohibited U.S. citizens and any
persons in U. S. territory from serving in foreign armies against nations
with which the United States was not at war. Section 5286 prohibited
organizing a military or hostile expedition in the U.S. that was to be
launched against a state with which the U.S. maintained friendly relations. These statutes also specified fines and prison terms against those
who violated them. 9 In addition to the Revised Statutes, the government
based its neutrality policy on a number of other considerations: presidential proclamations, legal precedents, international concerns, federal
court decisions, and the opinions and actions of the secretary of state,
attorney general, military officials, customs and immigration officials,
and state and municipal authorities. 10
Since Taft was not as active in foreign policy as his predecessor,
Theodore Roosevelt, policy-making was largely under the control of
Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, whose own policy regarding neutrality in relation to the Mexican revolt was heavily· influenced by his
solicitor, James Brown Scott. During the Roosevelt administration, Scott
had acquired a reputation as a defender both of free speech and of foreign residents in the United States." In December 1910, Knox advised
the Mexicangovernment that he disagreed with its demands to curtail
the subversive activities of Mexican rebels in the United States and to
halt arms smuggling across the border. At the end of January 1911, Knox
made a formal statement concerning this issue:
It is not an offense against the United States to transport arms,

ammunition, and munitions of war from this country to any foreign country, whether they are tq be used in war or not; nor is it
an offense against the United States for individuals to leave
this country with intent to enlist in foreign military service; nor
is it an offense against the United States to transport persons
out of this country and land them in foreign countries, although
such persons have an intent to enlist in foreign armies; nor is it
an offense agaisnt the United States to transport from this country persons intending to enlist in foreign armies and munitions
of war in the same ship. The purpose of the section in question
(R.S. 5286) is to prevent the use of the soil or waters of the
United States as a base, from which military expeditions or military enterprises shall be carried on against foreign powers with
which the United States is at peace. What it prohibits is a military expedition or a military enterprise from this country against
any foreign power at peace with the United States.'2
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Attorney General George W. Wickersham protested that Knox's position contradicted the president's instruction concerning neutrality enforcement. Wickersham also claimed that it obstructed the work of the
Departments of Justice, War, and the Treasury, whose members were
trying to ensure American neutrality in the Mexican conflict. The ability
of the u.s. government to repress the Maderistas who operated from
American soil was thus hindered not only by cabinet dissension, but
also by conditions along the border. The U.S. simply did not have sufficient numbers of police and soldiers to patrol the 2,000 miles that separated the two countries. 13 Wickersham was eventually successful in
acquiring Taft's consent to augment the number of troops, secret agents,
and customs officials along the border, but the increases were insufficient for the task. 14
Despite the limited number of American officials, several Maderistas
were arrested in Texas and Arizona and held for a grand jury throughout
the spring and summer of 1911. 15 This was due not only to Wickersham's
direction, but also to the diligence of government personnel (primarily
customs officials) at the local level. Some federal officials, such as Luther
T. Ellsworth, the u.S. Consul at Ciudad Porfirio Diaz, and Robert W.
Dowe, U.S. customs agent at Eagle Pass, Texas, did everything within
their power to persecute those they suspected of violating American
neutrality. These officers, with the aid of police and detectives (some of
whom were paid Mexican spies), gathered large amounts of evidence in
order to prosecute suspects. 16
In spite of these efforts, the rebels operated relatively freely because they enjoyed the sympathy of a large part of the population of
Texas and other southwestern states. Moreover, this sympathy increased
as the rebellion made gains in Mexico. It seemed to many Anglo and
Mexican Americans that the Maderistas were fighting for ideals such as
liberty and democracy-things never associated with the Diaz regime. I?
Collaborators, some of whom were military and government personnel,
constantly informed rebels of the movements oflaw enforcement agents
and the local sheriffs in counties closest to the border were hesitant to
arrest neutrality violators, since they were dependent on Mexican American votes to stay in office. In judicial cases that dealt with neutrality
violations, local courts and juries, swayed by popular sentiment, frequently acquitted suspects. 18
In the meantime, rebel groups in Chihuahua had begun to move
against Ciudad Juarez. On 7 January 1911, Orozco and his men evacuated Ciudad Guerrero in southern Chihuahua in view of the advance on
that town by a strong federal column under the command of General
Juan J. Navarro. 19 After circulating rumors to the effect that he was
planning an attack against Chihuahua, Orozco led his forces, together
with those commanded by Luis A. Garcia (a total of some 1,500 men), in
the direction of the border city. The contemplated attack had to be
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aborted, however, because on 4 February 1911, a large group of federal
reinforcements on the northwestern railway, under the command of Colonel Antonio Rabago, succeeded in slipping by the insurrecto encampment and into the city. The imminent arrival of more troops from Ciudad
Chihuahua under General Navarro was a further deterrent. 2o
Despite the withdrawal of the forces under Orozco and Garcia from
the border area, February witnessed an increase in the number of military engagements in both Chihuahua and the rest of Mexico. 21 Madero,
whose arrest the U.S. Department of Justice had ordered since the
insurrections's outbreak, was aware that the authories were fast closing
in on him. On the night of 13-14 February, he and his 130 men crossed
over to Zaragoza, Chihuahua, where they met the rebel group commanded
by Jose de 1a Luz SotO. 22 Proceeding southeast, the column arrived at
Guadalupe in the last week of February. While encamped there, Madero
learned that Casas Grandes was lightly defended and he decided to assault that town. Unwilling to wait for Orozco and his forces, whom he
had ordered to join him at Galeana, Madero instead sent instructions to
De la Luz Soto, whose men were encamped at Asuncion, located northeast of Casas Grandes. They were to proceed to Casas Grandes in preparation for a joint attack on the federal garrison. 23
The assault, carried out on 6 March 1911, ended in the rout of the
insurrectos because of the timely arrival of a force of federal cavalry
under Colonel Samuel Garcia Cuellar, who had initially been ordered to
recapture Asuncion. 24 Although the defeat constituted an undeniable
setback for the rebel campaign in Chihuahua, Madero's example of personal leadership and valor during the battle attracted further popular
support for the Anti-Reelectionist cause. Madero's leadership in battle
also provided the revolt with a strong directing force andfocus. 25 Henry
Lane Wilson, the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, and American consuls in
different regions submitted reports to the State Department, indicating
that the rebellion was spreading in Sonora and other northern states.
The reports also revealed that hostilities had begun or, in some cases,
resumed in Morelos, Guerrero, Tlaxcala, Puebla, Veracruz, Tabasco, and
Yucatan. 26
In response to the increased rebel activities, Taft ordered an additional 10,000 soldiers-the so-called "Maneuver Division"-to the border. Officially, the reinforcements were to engage only in training
operations and enforce neutrality laws. Unofficially, they were to supplement customs officials' efforts to intercept rebel arms shipmentsY Taft
confided to Army Chief-of-Staff General Leonard Wood that he had ordered the deployment so that they could be sent into Mexico to protect
American lives and property, should revolutionary conditions warrant
it. Taft doubted it would come to that, and he needed approval from
Congress to do so, but he was counting on the presence of the troops to
ensure that belligerent Mexican forces would respect U.S. interests. 28
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The additional American troops on the border coupled with increased
manuevering of the Pacific Fleet on the western coast of Mexico heightened tension between the two administrations. The Mexican government interpreted the actions as both insulting and threatening. 29
At the same time, leaders of American financial and business communities had begun to express their disillusionment with the Diaz regime. New York banking houses were angered by the nationalistic
financial policies of Mexico's Ministro de Hacienda, Jose Ives Limantour,
who sought loans and credit in Europe instead of the United States.
John D. Rockefeller, president of the Standard Oil Company, and Edward
L. Doheny, director of the Mexican Petroleum Company, were annoyed
when the Diaz regime stemmed American economic expansion in Mexico
by granting oil concessions to the British firm of W. D. Pearson and
Son. American mining corporations also de mended further concessions
from the Mexican government, but Diaz refused to authorize them. 30
A number of other diplomatic problems were also cause for American concern. The most serious of these was Diaz's refusal to renew the
U.S. government's lease of Magdalena Bay, located off Baja California.
The navy had been using this area as a coaling station and as a gunnery
practice range; with Diaz's action, U.S. naval authorities worried that
either the Diaz administration or a subsequent Mexican government would
lease both Magdalena Bay and nearby Turtle Bay to the Japanese. 31
Another source of American irritation arose from the fact that in 1909
Diaz had granted asylum to Nicaraguan dictator Jose Santos Zelaya,
whose government the U. S. had helped to overthrowY Despite these
problems, the Taft administration continued to cooperate with the Diaz
regime in maintaining American neutrality within the limits of the law
and with the resources at its disposal.
Following the Casas Grandes debacle, Madero, joined by Orozco
and Francisco Villa, proceeded to regroup his forces at Hacienda
Bustillos, some sixty miles northeast of Chihuahua. Despite the proximity of his encampment to the state capital, the provisional president
selected Ciudad Juarez as the next target. 33
In imitation of Orozco's actions during the first attempt to capture
the border city, Madero made it appear that he would soon march against
Chihuahua. Once federal troops had been transferred there to deter any
rebel assault, he moved his refurbished army, complete with some improvised "cannons" constructed out of scrap material at the Madera
railway shops, in the direction of Ciudad Juarez. On 15 April, the
insurrectos defeated a small federal advance force sent out from Ciudad
Juarez at Bauche, where the Mexican Central and Northwestern Railways intersected on the outskirts of the town. The insurrectos proceeded
to surround the border city on three sides and they soon had a force of
500 troops in the area, which outnumbered the federal defenders (less
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than 700) by three to one. 34
At the same time, an event occurred in Sonora that was to have
considerable bearing on the course of the rebellion: the capture of the
border town of Agua Prieta on 13 April 1911, by insurgent forces led by
Arturo "Colorado" Lopez, Juan N. Medina, Antonio Rojas, and other
leaders. 35 With the exception of the capture of Mexicali by the group of
Magonista insurrectos led by Jose Maria Leyva and Simon Berthold on
29 January 1911, this victory constituted the first time a Mexican border
town had fallen to rebel troopS.36 The occupation was short-lived, since,
during the night of 17-18 April, a federal column led by Colonel Reynaldo
Diaz retook the town. 37 The Maderista achievement might have proved
more durable had it not been for the lack of adequate coordination among
the various insurrecto groups in the region, as well as breaches of discipline among both officers and men. 38 During the final federal assault
that terminated with the penetration of the rebels' inner defense perimeter, three of the insurgent leaders-Arturo Lopez, Juan Medina and
Belisario Garcia-cros~,ed~the international line to safety in Douglas,
Arizona while many of their troops got drunk on alcoholic beverages
they had found in the town's stores and cantinas. 39
The brief occupation also did not afford the rebels a port of entry
for the importation of arms and other supplies. Cornelius O'Keefe, the
U.S. customs collector, had closed the customs facilities on the American side of the border when the insurrectos arrived on 13 April. O'Keefe
explained that he had done so to prevent the shipment of arms, munitions, and provisions to the rev'olutionists. In doing so, O'Keefe acted
in accordance with Wickersham's interpretation of the neutrality laws
rather than Knox's. 40 In any event, the Treasury Department drew
O'Keefe's attention to the fact that only the President or the Secretary
of the Treasury could legally close a port of entry, but they did not order
the port reopened. 41
Be that as it may, the temporary rebel victory at Agua Prieta constitute.d a significant reversal for the federal cause and obliged the central
government to send increasingly large bodies of reinforcements to the
northern theater of war. 42 The initial triumph of 13 April demonstrated
that not only were the Anti-Reelectionists capable of capturing a border
town, but and that sooner or later, they would do so again and gain more
permanent footholds in northern Mexico. The federal reconquest of the
town on 18 April proved to be one of the most bloody and hard-fought
battles of the war. A column of approximately 1,000 men suffered numerous casualties before achieving its objective. In addition, there could be
no assurance that the operation might not have to be repeated, since
most of the effectives who took part in the attack would have to be
transferred to some other dangerous place. The town also might have to
be abandoned altogether, thus making it a tempting target for insurrectos
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in the region.
The rebel victory, while short-lived, served to elevate the morale of
the northern insurgents, given the several reverses that they had experienced, such as the defeat at Casas Grandes and the prolonged siege of
Ojinaga that began on 14 March and had not yet ended. The progressive
concentration of federal troops in Chihuahua during the preceding
months had induced revolutionary groups in other regions of the country to increase their activities. Soon, other regions of Mexico would be
threatened, which would impose additional burdens on the federals' resources. 43
In the meantime, the planned assault on Ciudad Juarez had been
delayed because of the commander-in-chief's caution. Madero was
warned by Francisco Vazquez Gomez, one of his principal supporters,
that an attack on Ciudad Juarez might result in citizens' deaths in the
neighboring city of El Paso, thus provoking U.S. intervention. Madero
and the federal commander Navarro agreed to a five-day suspension of
hostilities. The truce commenced on 23 April and was to apply to a
limited quadrilateral region bounded on its four corners by Ciudad Juarez,
Chihuahua, Munaca and Casas Grandes. 44 The cease-fire provided an
opportunity to resume informal negotiations that had been going on
since the end of February. These efforts involved members of Madero's
family and others who shared the confidence of the leaders of the opposing forces. 45
During the previous months, President Diaz had adopted a number
of initiatives to curb the wave of uprisings in the country. His reforms
consisted of removing unpopular state governors such as Alberto
Terrazas in Chihuahua, Mucio Martinez in Puebla, and Enrique Munoz
Aristegui in Yucatan. He also made changes in all cabinet positions
except in the case of the Secretaria de Hacienda and the Secretaria de
Guerra y Marina. In an address delivered before Congress on 1 April,
Diaz likewise made proposals not only banning the reelection of the
president and vice-president, and the reforms of the electoral and judicial systems, but also the breakup of large rural landholdings. 46 These
concessions failed to stem revolutionary ferment that had gripped the
country, and, if anything, probably encouraged the rebels, since it was
interpreted by many as a sign of government weakness. 47
In the face of the imminent rebel attack against Ciudad Juarez, the
government was much more disposed to participate in discussions that
might lead to a solution to the conflict based upon compromise. By midApril, several weaknesses inherent in the Porfirian army had created a
military crisis for the federal forces. Diaz and his advisers realized that
the increased military demands were placing pressures upon the
country's limited resources to combat the insurrectos. Although the
army had fought with a degree of tenacity and fortitude, it was likely to
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fragment or collapse altogether should the conflict continue for any
length oftime. 48
Since its inception, the Porfirian regime had been more civil than
military in character. In order to remove the threat of a military coup,
Diaz had attempted to maintain an army that would be relatively weak,
but also strong enough to quell local rebellions. Basing his policy on
these contradictory objectives, he progressivley reduced the portion of
the budget dedicated to the army's maintenance. Between 1884 and 1910,
the number of effectives serving in the internal security forces was reduced by thirty percent. By 1910, official estimates put the total number
of soldiers at 29,000 but the actual figure was about half that--,-14,000and only 6,000 were eventually dispatched to Chihuahua to fight against
the dissident groups that had taken up arms since November of that
year. 49
To compensate for this numerical weakness, the Diaz government
could also count upon several corps of rurales (rural police) for defensive purposes. The rurales, some of whom were ex-bandits, were fairly
efficient and well-paid, unlike the regular rank-and-file soldiers who were
often recruited through the leva (draft). The government could also draw
upon the services of national guards that were under the jurisdiction of
the different states as well as private units of rurales that belonged to,
for example, municipios, haciendas, and mines. There also existed a socalled "auxiliary" federal force, made up of undertrained reserve elements. It was neither powerful nor useful as a military unit. Even with
these, the Porfirian forces did not total more than 30,000 men-too few
to deal with a general insurrection. 50
The progressive deterioration of the army, especially from January
1911 onward, motivated the government to adopt a series of measures in
order to increase the number of effectives in the armed forces. The most
important of these reforms consisted of strengthening those units destined for defensive purposes by incorporating civilian "volunteers," who
were usually financed by wealthy urban and rural families.5'
In general, however, the government was content to rely on the tropa
de linea (regular troops) and rurales to stem the rising tide of rebellion.
In the case of the regular army, the quality of the rank-and-file soldiers
left much to be desired. Desertion was a recurrent problem; though it
never became widespread. 52 A more serious problem existed with the
disaffection that appeared among federal troops as the campaign continued. In late January, for example, Louis Hostetter, the U.S. Consul at
Hermosillo, reported that federal troops charged with holding one of the
key passes at Sahuaripa had broken and fled in the face of the first rebel
. attack. 53 Such occurrences became more common and the government
found it increasingly difficult to find enough soldiers to replace those
they lost and to find those who had the will to fight.
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Recruiters in the central states reported that many men refused to
volunteer their services for fear that the government would send them
to Chihuahua or Yucatan, far from their homesY Resorting to the leva
did not help, either, because the government often resorted to pressing
recruits into service who had been serving time in jailor who came from
the most poverty-stricken areas of Mexico City. Such soldiers did not
relish either army life or having to risk their lives in combat for a government that had done little for them in the past. 55
The methods the Diaz government relied on to combat the rebellion
also proved ineffective. The federal army revealed considerable ability
on the defense, but its senior leaders lacked the initiative and experience to undertake offensive operations' against the rebels. The army's
counter-insurgency strategy consisted essentially in concentrating its
forces in the larger cities and mobilizing smaller columns to ferret out
rebel parties and destroy them. These columns rarely operated far from
railway lines, in part because of their commanders' wishes to minimize
desertions that normally would occur on overland marches, but also to
maintain contact with supply bases. Such tactics, however, were rarely
successful against an enemy as wide-ranging and seemingly ephemeral
as the Mexican insurrectos.
The federal contingents, well-armed but slow, were pitted against
an enemy composed of men who were well acquainted with the region in
which they fought. 56 Unlike the counter-guerrilla strategy the British
employed during the second Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, the Mexican federal army did not possess sufficient cavalry units to form large
flying ,columns, which would have enabled it to surround and destroy
rebel groups. 57
In time, the federals abandoned their attempts to eradicate the
insurrecto groups in rural areas and instead concentrated on safeguarding the most important strategic points. Troops were shunted from garrison to garrison via the railways, their principal communications arteries,
in order to fortify areas under siege. 58 Thefederals attempted to protect
railway lines with armored trains and small cavalry patrols, but they did
not have enough men and rolling stock to guard the entire system. Because of dangers of rebel ambushes and mines buried in road beds, it
became increasingly difficult to hire engineers who could operate troop
and supply trains. Rebel forces also attacked telegraph and train lines
throughout the rebellion, which proved very efficient at preventing
federals from reinforcing their own garrisons. 59
Only a radical change in strategy and tactics would have saved the
Porfirian army from defeat. As the distinguished Mexican military historian colonel Miguel Sanchez Lamego has commented:
... the war which was being fought presented peculiarities which
existing regulations did not take into account; it was absolutely
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necessary, therefore, to modify the organization of the existing
army units, so that these, with a new role to play, could respond
to the demands fo{ modern warfare. 60
. Nevertheless, the federal high command refused to modify its techniques
during the 1910-1911 rebellion. Unlike the situation the British faced in
South Africa during their struggle with the Boers, the Mexican federal
army did not have the immense manpower reserves from which to draw.
Having sufficient manpower would have permitted federal forces to undertake both offensive and defensive operations concurrently.61
These factors-the lack of initiative and manpower-coupled with
shortcomings in the supply system (munitions and other necess'ities
often did not arrive when they were most needed), constituted serious
deficiencies in the federal army as a fightingmachineY Such weaknesses
help to explain the defensive posture-which some have interpreted as
defeatist-the federals adopted during the 1910-1911 campaign.
The principal condition that the insurrectos insisted upon when
negotiating a peace was the resignations of both President Diaz and
Vice-President Ramon Corral. This created an initial stumbling block to
the peace discussions. 63 As the talks progressed, Madero relented somewhat on his insistence regarding Diaz's removal and instead concentrated on demands for changes in the cabinet and state gubernatorial
posts, on electoral reform, the pardoning of political prisoners, the evacuation of federal troops from the northern states, government recognition
of some of the military ranks held by rebel officers, the immediate resignation of Corral, and the designation of a new Secretaria de Relaciones
Exteriores with the prior approval of the insurrecto provisional government.
The peace discussions became official with the designation of Francisco Carbajal, Magistrate of the Supreme Court, as the government representative on 26 April. Madero appointed his father, Don Francisco
Madero, Dr. Francisco Vazquez Gomez, and Jose Maria Pino Suarez as
representatives ·for the insurrecto faction. Although the truce was extended for another Jive days, until 3 May, and included additional territory between Ciudad Juarez and Ojinaga, nothing came of the talks
because of Madero's renewed insistence that Diaz resign and the latter's
reluctance to do so under pressure. 64
On 7 May, the breakdown of the peace negotiations and Vazquez
Gomez's admonitions about bad results should the rebels assault Juarez
led Madero to order his troops to suspend the siege and move south.
His plan at this point involved launching an attack against Chihuahua
and eventually marching upon Mexico City. He did not, however, close
the door to further talks, having instructed his peace negotiators to
remain in El Paso to consider any new proposals the government advanced. 65 That same day, following a prolonged two-day session with
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Anti-Reelectionist attack of Ciudad Juarez. Map after Vicente Cazarrubias,
Centro de Informacion del Estado de Chihuahua, Chihuahua, Mexico.
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his cabinet, President Diaz issued a declaration in which he accepted
the possibility that he might resign, as long as he could be satisfied that
'the country would not slip into a situation of anarchy and chaos. 66
Any hope, however, that Diaz's statement might lead to a renewal of
the peace discussions was shattered on the morning of the following
day (8 May) when some of the insurrecto soldiers fired on the town
without Madero's authorization. When informed of Madero's plans to
march south, Orozco, Francisco Villa, and Giuseppe Garibaldi, an Italian
soldier of fortune with Madero's forces, secretly agreed to fire upon the
federals without Madero's knowledge or consent. At 10:30 AM, the
rebel troops who occupied forward positions opened fire on the federal
outer ring of defenses. Madero tried unsuccessfully to check his men,
but he had no alternative except to order a massive assault on the town.
The insurrectos captured Ciudad Juarez two days later. 67 .
Advancing east along the right bank of the Rio Grande, c~lumns of
rebel soldiers under Orozco and Garibaldi occupied the parts of the city
closest to El Paso. They then worked their way south, breaking holes
through the adobe walls so as not to completely expose themselves to
federal fire in the streets. The column commanded by Garibaldi included
a Foreign Legion contingent of 200-300 volunteers of vaious nationalities. A third column under Jose de la Luz Blanco attacked from the east.
The rebels cut off the town's water supply by blocking the current in the
acequia madre and shutting off the engine in the pumping station. From
the south, a fourth column under Villa's command advanced along the
railroad line and captured the roundhouse and the Ketelson and Degetau
warehouses.
Over the next two days, rebels captured the bull ring, cowboy corral, post office, church, and other strongholds of the federals' inner
defenses. By the morning of the third day (10 may), only the cuartel
general (barracks) remained in federal hands. Shortly after noon, realizing that further resistance was useless, General Navarro and the remainder of his garrison surrendered. 68
The most important result of the rebel victory at Ciudad Juarez was
its influence on the the U.S. government's perception of the upheaval in
Mexico. WHile the capture of Ciudad Juarez and other towns along the
border did not lead the United States to label the Anti-Reelectionists as
belligerants, the fall of the border city nevertheless obliged the U.S. to
recognize that a fundamental political change was occurring in Mexico
at the national level and that Diaz's downfall was inevitable. On 12 May
1911, after conferring with Secretary of State Knox and Attorney Gen. era I Wickersham, President William H. Taft decided to recognize the
Anti-Reelectionists' de facto control of the international port of entry
and to keep U.S. customs facilities open. Taft justified this action by
explaining that:
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... international law favors the continuance of commercial transactions and holds them innocent in a neutral country until those
transactions become really a part of a military operation against
a friendly government. The mere sale ... of supplies in El Paso
to Mexicans, whether insurrectos or supporters of the Government, and their delivery across the border, without more, is not
a violation of international law or of the neutrality statute. 69
Taft's decision gave the insurrectos the right to receive merchandise, including arms, munitions, food and other necessary war materials.
In reply to critics who claimed that such a policy favored the insurrecto
cause over that of the Mexican federal forces, Taft acknowledged the
validity of their argument, but claimed that such a situation had resulted
from the weakness of the Diaz government, for which the U.S. was not
responsible. 70
Not only did the capture of Ciudad Juarez make possible the legal
importation of arms and ammunition, but it also made the rebels much
more solvent economically. Control of the customhouse on the Mexican
side of the border gave the insurrectos the right to collect import taxes,
thus affording them an additional source of income with which to finance further military operations. They could also borrow money from
banks in Ciudad Juarez, under pressure if necessary and U.S. bankers
would also be more inclined to lend money to the revolutionary junta in
view of the likelihood that it would soon form a legally constituted government in Mexico. 71
Almost overnight, the victory considerably enhanced Madero's image and movement he represented in the minds of Americans and Mexicans as a whole. Ciudad Juarez, during the course of the Maderista revolt
in the north, had become the focal point of U.S. and even world attention. News reports about the city's capture made the front page of many
of the world's leading daily papers. They extolled Madero, Orozco, Villa,
and Garibaldi as heroes in the battle. In the days after the Juarez's capture, Madero, Abraham Gonzalez, and the principal rebel military officials were invited to several banquets held in their honor by civil and
military officials in EI Paso. Victory celebrations also occurred in Ciudad
Juarez, depite the destruction and disorganization the fighting had
caused. 72
The fall of the border city caused the federal government to withdraw troops from towns in the northern border region to protect the
state capitals in the interior, as well as the larger urban centers further
south. Ojinaga was finally occupied by the rebel group led by Jose de la
Cruz Sanchez on 8 May 1911. 73 On 9 May 1911, Tijuana fell to a group of
Magonista rebels led by the Welshman Caryl Ap Rhys Pryce. 74 A few
days later the Maderistas occupied Agua Prieta and Naco following the
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federal evacuation of these towns. 75 After rebel occupation, the U.S.
government informed Mexico that'it would permit the passage of merchandise and other materials at these points. Not only were there numerous historical antecedents fordoing so, it declared, but it also
believed that commerce should be carried on normally in any port of
entry into a foreign country whose functioning could be guaranteed,
independently of whomever was in control of the customhouse receiving the goods being imported. 76
It is worth inquiring at this point whether, as some writers have
asserted, the federal army could have undertaken an expedition to retake Ciudad Juarez after its capture. A related question is whether or not
the Diaz government could have adopted a more aggressive stance in
the face of a defeat that many considered inevitable, instead of merely
holding on to the cities they still occupied. Ambassador Wilson claimed
that Diaz, "deserted by many of his oldest friends and reluctant to spill
more Mexican blood, yielded to what seemed to be the inevitable but
really was the culmination of a national hysteria which would have subsided if vigorously and unitedly opposed."77 Any attempt to answer
this question requires an analysis of the military situation in Chihuahua
and the war in Mexico.
The capture of the federal garrison in Ciudad Juarez took 600 soldiers-a tenth of the federal forces stationed in Chihuahua-in a single
stroke out of combat. 78 The' defeat was a catastrophe for the Porfirian
cause in the region. The rebel seizure of Ciudad Juarez and Ojinaga gave
the Maderistas control over virtually the entire northern portion of the
state. 79
In addition, the guerrilla warfare that had been characteristic of the
Mexican insurrectos gave way to one of positions. The steady aggregation of men and arms had transformed the rebel column Madero led into
an army, though small and undisciplined. 80 It now possessed a pair of
field guns captured from the federal garrison in Ciudad Juarez along
with other services such as rail transport, a commissariat, and even a
medical corps,81
Madero's army would most likely march next on Chihuahua City.
Observers doubted that the federals would be able to retain control· over
this city or any other town in the southern portion of the state. 82 Ambassador Wilson, writing from Mexico City, commented that "[T]he fall
of Ciudad Juarez has produced a great gloom in this city as it is probably
the prelude to the defeat of the army of [General Antonio] Rabago and
the taking of Chihuahua."83
The capture of Ciudad Juarez also boosted morale of the AntiReelectionist movement in general. Not only did it help to rebitalize the
rebel troops' confidence ·in Madero and the Anti-Reelectionist cause,
but it also facilitated recruitment among those Mexicans who had waited
for one or the other side to prevail. With the fall of the border city, rebel
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activities greatly increased in number and magnitude throughout the
country.84
The federal army's morale, in comparison, took a noticeable plunge.
The battle of Ciudad Juarez had, in many ways, been a siege tournament
of sorts in which relatively large numbers of contending forces fought
hard to succeed. The fact that the Mexican regular army had been beaten
in a pitched battle by groups of undisciplines peones sent shock waves
reverberating throughout the army and resulted in a marked loss of federal soldiers' confidence to win. This lack of federal resolve to continue
fighting is reflected in the rapid deterioration of their situation in the ten
days after Juarez fell and before the peace agreement was signed. During this period, the ports of Acapulco, Manzanillo, and Mazatlan, as
well as the provincial capitals of Chilpancingo, Colima, Pachuca, and
Zacatecas, were fell to the rebels. Other major towns, such as Uruapan,
Iguala, Cuautla, Huatusco, and Tulancingo, were also conquered. 85 The
fighting also spread to other states such as Guanajuato, Oaxaca and
Chiapas, which up to that date had experienced little revolutionary activity.86
A particularly noteworthy example of the collapse of federal morale
occurred when Emilio Madero, Jesus Agustin Castro, and other
Durangan and Coahuilan leaders assaulted Torreon, the hub of the railway transportation network in the north. As the rebel contingents took
the outlying towns of Gomez Palacio and Lerdo and massed for an assault on the city, the federal commander General Emiliano Lojero panicked and moved his men out the night of 14-15 May during a heavy
rainstorm. The evacuation occurred so quickly that many federal soldiers were left without forward defensesY The sacrifice of Torreon without a fight proved a serious error. When rebel forces captured the
southern Chihuahuan town of Santa Fosalia de Camargo, Chihuahua
city was effectively cut off from possible reinforcement from the south. 88
Given this situation, the Diaz government had no option, from the
military standpoint, than a peace agreement. Negotiations had resumed
the day after the fall of Juarez. On 17 May, Madero wired Diaz to advise
him of conditions: Diaz's resignation, Corral's resignation, the complete
overhaul of the cabinet, and the detention of General Bernardo Reyes,
who had returned to Mexico upon Diaz's request. Madero sent another
message later that day with a list of people he recommended for cabinet
and other government positions. Diaz accepted the conditions without
delay and a'new five-day armistice went into effect. The resulting peace
treaty, signed in front of the Juarez customhouse late on 21 May, stipulated that Diaz and Corral should resign by the end of the month and
that Francisco Leon de la Barra should serve as interim president and
call for general elections. Furthermore, hostilities would cease and the
insurrecto forces would be disbanded and the interim government was
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to consider popular desires with a view to satisfying them, and arrange
for indemnification for damages incurred during the fighting. 89 .
By 21 May, when the peace accords were signed, Ambassador Wilson estimated that the insurrectos control1ed roughly two-thirds of the
country and the "remaining one third was rapidly tending to the same
direction."90 The federals controlled only the state capitals ofHermosil1o,
Saltil1o, Chihuahua, Culiacan, Durango, and Cuernavaca. All of these
centers were under rebel siege and, in each case, the water supply had
either been cut off or was in the process of being severed. The federal
army had gradual1y been reduced to its Mexico City garrison, where its
largest contingents were held in reserve. It was only a matter of time
before a battle for control of the Feder DistriCt would begin. 91 Even in
the nation's capital, however, there existed an internal as well as an
external threat, since, on 24 May 1911, public riots and manifestations
broke out to protest the delay in the presentation of the president's
resignation to the congress. On the afternoon of the following day, Diaz
presented his resignation, and a week later sailed to Europe in exile. 92 ·
The Treaty of Ciudad Juarez was later criticized by those who claimed
it brought a compromise government into power in which many conservative elements of the. former administration remained. Though Diaz,
Corral, Limantour,and other more prominent figures were gone, the government bureaucracy retained many adherents of the old regime and the
,federal army, though defeated in battle, remained intact since its officer
corps and internal structure stil1 existed. 93
In negotiating the treaty, Madero had focused on his primary goal:
removing Diaz and his main associates from power. The social and economic reforms announced in the Plan of San Luis Potosi-such as that
with regard to land redistribution~wouldhave to wait for a later date.
As historian Knight has commented, Madero and other members of the
revolutionary and Porfirian elites were not in any hurry to enact these
reforms. They were eager to end the ·war and ensure Mexican internal
stability. Madero personal1y abhorred war and had only resorted to force
when he saw no other alternative for political change. Atthe war's end,
he felt it was time to work for political and social reform through civilian
rule. 94
The treaty did not bring lasting peace to Mexico, however. The old
regime's bureaucratic and military structure hindered reform and worked
to lessen presidential power after Madero's election to that office in
October 1911. The administration was plagued by a number of upris'ings
that culminated in the coup of February 1913 and Madero's assassination.
In conclusion, the Diaz government had considered Chihuahua, in
view of rebel successes there, the most critical area in its counter-insurgency campaign. It had, therefore, considerably increased its military
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presence there in the months prior to the attack on Ciudad Juarez. This
signified that the outcome of the rebellion in northern Mexico would
thus hinge on military developments in that state.
The eventual rebel capture of the border city did not in itself constitute .the turn of the rebellion tide.' The real change in rebel fortunes
occurred earlier, in April, when insurrecto activities increased throughout the country. The rebel seizure of the Sonoran border town of Agua
Prieta (though short-lived), acquired an added significance with regard
to the war ni the northern borderlands and the country in general. It was
apparent to military authorities that although the rebels had not achieved
definitive success in any bne region, neither could the army quell the
uprising. The Diaz government realized that it could not maintain a sustained military effort indefinitely. Doubting that the army could contain
the insurrection, government officials began to consider a negotiated
end to the struggle.
The fall of Ciudad Juarez to the rebels resulted in the loss of one of
two key federal garrisons in the area; the other was in Chihuahua City,
the state capitol. This loss proved irreparable, since the army, weakened
and demoralized, had no hope of recapturing the town. Although these
battles occurred on Mexico's northern fringe, the effects of the rebel
capture of the most populous and strategic communications hub on the
border spread into the country's interior, boosting the revolutionary
movement in general.
An even more important result of the battle was the change in attitude on the part of the U.S. government toward the rebellion. It was
evident to Taft that a political change was inevitable in Mexico and
Diaz's days in power were numbered. The rebel capture of a port-ofentry coupled with the U.S. decision to keep its customs facilities open
allowed the insurrectos to obtain additional arms, money, and other supplies necessary to continue the fight.
Under these circumstances, the Diaz government had no other alternative than making peace with the rebels. The treaty that ended the
struggle, though it achieved Madero's initial aim ofbringing Diaz down,
did not result in any fundamental reforms or changes for the country.
Thus, further strife would develop throughout the decade from 19101920, the effects of which can still be felt today.
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